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One Step Forward and Two Steps

Back: The Shopping Kart
General Knit Dance

-

By Duane C. Aldrich*
and
Richard R. Carlson**

In the space of less than two years, the National Labor Relation
Board's Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.' experiment was born and laid
to rest in a drama of zealous forensics worthy of the union representation
campaigns that Shopping Kart sought to deregulate. Shopping Kart,
which would have radically curtailed Board review of the truthfulness of
union and employer representation campaign propaganda, was disavowed
by a new Board majority in General Knit, Inc.,' with the result that the
Board's pre-Shopping Kart policy of scrutiny of campaign propaganda
was substantially, if not completely, restored. Although Shopping Kart
may be of no further value as precedent, the conflict exposed by the
Shopping Kart experience may significantly affect the future of Board
regulation of union and employer propaganda. In this article the authors
will explore the development of Board review of representation campaign
propaganda, the possible future of Board review under General Knit, and
the policy questions and complications surrounding such review.

I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOARD REVIEW OF CAMPAIGN
MISREPRESENTATIONS

The authority of the Board to regulate representation campaign behav* Partner, Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Georgia. Harvard University (A.B., 1965, LL. B.,
1968). Member of the State Bar of Georgia and the District of Columbia Bar.
** Associate, Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Georgia. Wake Forest University (B.A., 1976);
University of Georgia (J.D., 1979). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977).
2. 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
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ior is derived in part from section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (Act),3 providing that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise" of
their right to form or join labor organizations. In the early years following
the passage of the Act, the Board focused on the problem of campaign
propaganda almost exclusively in these terms. It acted to set aside elections that were possibly influenced by an employer's anti-union statements to his employees, while it left unions free to engage in vigorous
campaigns.
In Fickett-Brown ManufacturingCo.,' for example, the Board set aside
an election on the ground that just prior to the election the employer had
"interfered" with his employees' free choice by stating to them that although he would bargain with any representative they might elect, they
should not be misled by the union's "extravagant promises" or "rash
statements made for selfish purposes." On the other hand, the Board
turned a deaf ear to employers' objections to union propaganda. In R. R.
DonneUey & Sons Co.,' the Board held that a union's defamatory remarks about the employer would not warrant setting the election aside;
the employer's only remedy was a lawsuit against the union for
defamation.
.The Board's double standard for election propaganda was a means of
equalizing the power of unions and employers during the infancy period
of modern labor organizations. In view of the power wielded over employees by the employer, the Board thought that any anti-union statement by
the employer must have implicit coercive force.7 The campaigning union,
however, lacking the power of employment and discharge, was not viewed
as a threat to the employees' free choice as long as the union's campaign
statements were not intrinsically coercive. The Board dismissed as irrelevant objections to the untruthfulness of union propaganda, reasoning that
employees must be presumed to be mature enough to know propaganda

3.

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). The present National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 151-69 (1976), had its beginning with the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub.
L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The 1935 Act was amended by the Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136. The Act was further
amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. A final amendment was the Act of July 26, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. All subsequent references will be to "the Act" unless otherwise specified.
4. 53 N.L.R.B. 106, 13 L.R.R.M. 98 (1943).
5. Id. at 108, 13 L.R.R.M. at 98.
6. 59 N.L.R.B. 122, 15 L.R.R.M. 192 (1944).
7. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 342, 351-53, 6 L.R.R.M. 310, 310-311 (1940),
enforced, 122 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1941). Accord, NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d
Cir. 1941).
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for what it was. Likewise, truthfulness was no defense to an objection to
employer propaganda since employer propaganda was per se an unfair
labor practice. Thus, the Board initially took the view that employees
were intelligent voters needing protection from coercion and duress, but
not from campaign propaganda and misrepresentation.
These premises persisted in Board decisions until 1944, when the
Board's requirement of strict neutrality of employers was overruled by
the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. In that
case, the Court extended the first amendment right of free speech to employers and held that statements of opinion by employers about the benefits of unionization, absent circumstances lending coercive force to the
statements, are protected by the first amendment and cannot be prohibited as unfair employment practices.
Following Virginia Electric & Power Co., the Board enforced its rule of
strict neutrality only in situations in which the employer made a "captive
audience" of its employees, reasoning that the use of the employer-employee relationship to force employees to hear the employer's opinion was
more coercive than the statement of the opinion itself.10 Even in this limited application the strict neutrality rule was fully and finally abrogated
by the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act," which amended section 8 of the
National Labor Relations Act to provide: "The expressing of any views,
argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . .

.

if such expression

contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.""' Consequently, after the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board was precluded from finding employer speech to be an unfair labor practice if the only coercive
element in the speech was that it was made by one holding the power of
employment.
But the Board's responsibility to remedy unfair labor practices is not
the only source of the Board's power to regulate campaign behavior. Another source of power emanates from the Board's responsibility to conduct representation elections and to certify winning labor organizations,1"
and it was this alternative source of power to which the Board turned,
following the Taft-Hartley Act, in the belief that the Board's campaign
8. See, e.g., Maywood Hosiery Mills, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 146, 150, 17 L.R.R.M. 90, 91
(1945); Corn Products Refining Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441, 1442, 15 L.R.R.M. 104, 105 (1944).
9. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
10. See, e.g., Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 18 L.R.R.M. 1360 (1946), enforced, 163
F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
11. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-187 (1976)).
12. Id., § 101, 8(c), 61 Stat. 142 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976)).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
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management functions were unaffected by the "free speech" amendment
to section 8. Accordingly, the Board began to approach campaign propaganda from its role as supervisor of representation elections. This
new
14
period of Board regulation commenced with General Shoe Corp.
In General Shoe, the union charged that on the day preceding the election, the employer had brought his employees to'his office in small groups
to hear an "intemperate anti-union address."15 The Board found that the
employer's harangue did not and could not constitute an unfair labor
practice." However, as the employer's conduct was challenged as having
impaired the employees' freedom of choice, the Board held that it would
not recognize the election results.1 7 Wary of the first amendment shoals
exposed by Virginia Electric & Power Co., the Board emphasized that it
viewed the case as involving improper conduct.1' It made no issue of the
content of the employer's speech but only of the coercive manner in
which the speech was delivered.
In judging the seriousness of the employer's misconduct, the Board introduced the standard of campaign propriety that remains to this day the
foundation for the regulation of campaign conduct and speech:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory
in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly
ideal as possible to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.
It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled. When, in the rare extreme case,
the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of others, the
requisite laboratory conditions are not present and the experiment must
be conducted over again. 1'
Thus did the Board utter the metaphor that has since plagued the law
of representation campaign speech. While the "laboratory conditions"
policy seems to require nearly ideal conditions, by necessity it must be
satisfied with something less, leaving the Board a wide range of discretion
within which to judge campaign propaganda. In one sense, however, General Shoe represented a marked improvement over the past, for it cleared
the way for Board regulation of union campaign propaganda as well as
employer campaign propaganda at a time when unionism was gaining
strength and momentum.
Initially, the Board applied General Shoe only in those cases in which
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
Id. at 126-27, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340.
Id. at 126, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340.
Id. at 126-27, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340.
Id. at 127, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340.
Id. at 127, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1341.
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campaign conduct had created "an atmosphere calculated to prevent a
free and untrammeled choice by the employees."20 From this it soon followed that the substance as well as the manner of campaign propaganda
might destroy the desired laboratory conditions. The first step in this direction was taken in United Aircraft Corp.,21 in which the Board held
that a union's forgery of an apology from one of the rival unions required
that the election be set aside, because the employees were deceived as to
the source of the statement and were unable to evaluate it as propaganda.
With Gummed Products Co.," the Board finally returned to its policy
of censorship of campaign speech content under its new-found powers of
campaign management. In Gummed Products, a union distributed handbills misstating the wage rates negotiated by the union with one of the
employer's competitors." The Board set the election aside, relying on
United Aircraft for the principle that even non-coercive campaign speech
may sometimes prevent the employees' free choice.' 4
In subsequent cases, the Board established, case by case, a variety of
tests to determine whether the "laboratory conditions" of the election
had been seriously infected by campaign misrepresentations. 5 The consolidation of these tests was accomplished in Hollywood Ceramics Co.'6
and, except for the Shopping Kart interlude, the Hollywood Ceramics
test of campaign misrepresentations has remained the Board's guiding
precedent. In Hollywood Ceramics, the employer contested an election in
which the union had distributed a misleading handbill on the afternoon
before the election. The handbill, printed in English and Spanish, compared the employer's wage rates with avowedly higher wage rates at unionized plants.' 7 While the union's figures included incentive payments in
the amount of wages paid at unionized plants, they did not take into account incentive payments in the employer's wage rates. Moreover, only
the English version of the handbill disclosed that incentive payments
were included in the wage rates at the unionized plants.' 8
20. Id. at 126, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340. See, e.g., Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 790,
29 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1952).
21. 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 31 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1953).
22. 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 36 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1955).
23. Id. at 1092-93, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1156.
24. Id. at 1093-94, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1156-57.
25. See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 901, 47 L.R.R.M. 1436 (1961);
Cleveland Trencher Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 600, 47 L.R.R.M. 1371 (1961); Kawneer Co., 19
N.L.R.B. 1460, 41 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1958); Calidyne Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1026, 39 L.R.R.M. 1364
(1957).
26. 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
27. Id. at 222-23, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1600-01.
28. Id.
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Recalling its "laboratory conditions" standard,2" the Board set aside
the election and adopted the following rule:
We believe that an election should be set aside only where there has been
a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which involves a
substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents the other
party or parties from making an effective reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to have a
significant impact on the election."
The Board added, however, that it would not set aside an election for a
misrepresentation not likely to have had more than a de minimus effect
on the election.3 1 In determining the impact of the misrepresentation, the
Board listed other possible inquiries: (1) whether the person who made
the statement possessed intimate knowledge of the matter so as to gain
special credibility among employees; (2) whether the employees possessed
independent knowledge with which to evaluate the statements, or were
put on notice of the unreliability of the statement by its extravagance;
and (3) as a catchall, whether under the circumstances of the case, the
misrepresentation could have had only a minimal effect on the employees'
choice.3 2
Applying these tests to the facts in Hollywood Ceramics, the Board
found that the union's "gross" misrepresentation of comparative wage
rates destroyed the laboratory conditions of the election. 83 The distribution of the handbill in the afternoon before the election left the employer
no time to rebut the union's misrepresentation. Furthermore, the misrepresentation was of a matter likely to affect the outcome of the election,
since the ability of the union to negotiate higher wages was a principal
issue in the campaign.
Hollywood Ceramics established the first comprehensive framework in
which the laboratory conditions ideal might be implemented. Nevertheless, the Hollywood Ceramics test of campaign misrepresentations has
been the object of an abundance of criticism. A primary criticism of the
test is that it is often uncertain in result and unfair in application. Opponents of the rule contend that the subjective character of the test leads to
inconsistent enforcement." Some have charged that Hollywood Ceramics
gives the Board freedom to practice its anti-employer bias by scrutinizing
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 223, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1601.
Id. at 224, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1601.
Id. at 224, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1602.
Id.
Id. at 225-26, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1602.
See, e.g., R. WILLIAMS, P. JANus & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 57 (1974); Bok, Regulation of Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78
HARv. L REv. 38, 92 (1964).
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employer statements more carefully than union statements," while others
have contended that a subjective standard of review enables employers to
delay collective bargaining with victorious unions by filing frivolous objections that take months or years to reach final decision." Still another
criticism is that the Hollywood Ceramics standard invites the courts to
substitute their judgment for that of the Board in reviewing the Board's
decisions, adding still more unpredictability and delay to the election
process.8
"Those inherent dangers make it in some degree tempting to abandon
the approach taken in Hollywood Ceramics," the Board conceded in the
1973 case of Modine Manufacturing Co.," "but this we are not prepared
to do."' 9 Nonetheless, Modine Manufacturingadumbrated the temporary
demise of Hollywood Ceramics. Member Penello indicated that he was
ready to overrule Hollywood Ceramics.4 0 The majority, while continuing
to adhere to Hollywood Ceramics, emphasized that it would not insist
upon "unrealistic standards" or "improbable purity," and noted that
workers had gained experience over the many years of unionization and
were more capable of independently analyzing campaign propaganda.4 1

II.

THE

Shopping Kart-GeneralKnit Dialectic

Shopping Kart followed four years after Modine Manufacturing, with
Member Penello now leading a majority finally willing to discard
Hollywood Ceramics in favor of alternative standards of review. The
union in Shopping Kart had represented to employees that the employer
had earned profits of $500,000 during the preceding year. In fact, the employer's profits had been only $50,000.42 Though all members concurred
that the election should be sustained, their reasons for so holding revealed a deep division within the Board.
Member Penello was joined by Member Walther in an opinion which
was highly critical of the Board's experience under Hollywood Ceramics
and which espoused an end to Board review of misleading campaign
propaganda. Summarizing years of scholarly and judicial disapproval of
35. See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 141, 146 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Lord
Baltimore Press, Inc., 370 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1966).
36. See, e.g., R. WIuLMs, P. JANus & K. HUHN, supra note 34, at 60.
37. See, e.g., Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 1312, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706.
J. FEERICK, H. BAER & J. ARA, NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS LAW, PRACTICE PROCEDURE

412-17 (1979).

38. 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 83 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
39. Id. at 530, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1136.
40. Id. at 530 n.6, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1136 n.6.
41. Id. at 530, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1136.
42. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
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the Board's practices under Hollywood Ceramics, Member Penello argued
that Board regulation of campaign speech had been exercised inconsistently and had caused substantial delay in the certification of election
results.' 8 Citing a recent empirical study conducted by Professors Getman
and Goldberg, Member Penello asserted that the Board's regulation of
speech under Hollywood Ceramics served no purpose, since the great majority of employee voters were unaffected by campaign propaganda."' In
the future, Member Penello declared, Board intervention should occur
only "in instances where a party has engaged in such deceptive practices
as improperly involving the Board and its processes, or the use of forged
documents which render the voters unable to recognize the propaganda
for what it is."' 5 In effect, Member Penello noted, his rule would return
the Board to its early post-General Shoe practice of reviewing the man6
ner of deception rather than the substance of deception.4
Member Penello's opinion provoked a strenuous dissent by Members
Fanning and Jenkins, who continued to adhere to the policy of comprehensive review of campaign propaganda. They agreed that the union's
misstatement of employer profits should not result in the setting aside of
the election results, but only on the ground that the misstatement was
not a substantial misrepresentation within the meaning of Hollywood Ceramics.47 In restating the Hollywood Ceramics rule, however, Members
Fanning and Jenkins indicated that they would revise Hollywood Ceramics to require that a misrepresentation not warrant the setting aside of an
election unless the speaker professed or appeared to have "special knowledge" of the facts misrepresented. 8 Previously, the speaker's special
knowledge of the facts misrepresented had been only a factor, albeit an
important one, in determining whether the misrepresentation was a substantial one." °
In defense of Board regulation of campaign speech content, Members
Fanning and Jenkins contended that Hollywood Ceramics had not seriously obstructed the conclusion of representation elections, citing figures
showing that misrepresentation objections were filed in only three to four
and one-half percent of all cases."° Furthermore, Members Fanning and
Jenkins insisted that close supervision of campaigns was necessary to create an atmosphere conducive to the voters' intelligent choice, and that

43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1312-1313, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
Id. at 1313, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
Id. at 1313, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.

46. Id.
47. Id. at 1315, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709.
48. Id.
49.
50.

See text accompanying note 30 supra.
228 N.L.R.B. at 1316, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710.
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the empirical evidence to the contrary was of dubious merit." Conceding,
for the sake of argument, that campaign propaganda affected election results in only a few cases, Members Fanning and Jenkins argued that to
maintain the integrity of the election process the Board must remove any
doubt of unfairness in those cases in which Hollywood Ceramics objections are filed. 2
Casting the pivotal vote, Chairman Murphy joined Members Penello
and Walther in overturning Hollywood Ceramics but stopped short of
adopting their proposed rule. Rather, Chairman Murphy suggested that
the Board might still set aside an election in which there occurred an
"egregious" misstatement of the facts.53 "This is not to say that I shall set
aside elections even on gross errors or will examine statements, oral or
written, for mere truth or falsity," Chairman Murphy assured, "nor shall
I look to reliance or possible reliance upon any such statements."' But
Chairman Murphy did not specify any factor or standards to which she
would look in finding a misstatement to be egregious.
Curiously, Chairman Murphy referred to the opinion of Members
Penello and Walther as the "majority" position, and held:
In view of our decision herein, elections will no longer be set aside solely
on the basis of misleading oral or written statements unless, for example,
a party has engaged in deceptive campaign practices such as involve the
Board and its processes or the use of forged documents which render the
voters unable to recognize the propaganda for what it is.55
Yet it would appear that Chairman Murphy's opinion provided the effective holding of the case, since Members Fanning and Jenkins implicitly
concurred with her to the extent that an "egregious" misrepresentation is
also a "substantial" misrepresentation under Hollywood Ceramics. Thus,
all five members participating in the Shopping Kart opinion would have
continued to set aside elections where one party had used forgery or had
improperly involved the Board and its processes, and a majority of three
members would have set aside elections in which a party had made an
egregious misrepresentation of fact.
One can only speculate about the degree of falsity required of a misrepresentation before it becomes truly "egregious" rather than merely substantial. Shopping Kart was too short-lived to provide an answer. In her
Shopping Kart opinion, Chairman Murphy offered as examples of
nonegregious misrepresentation earlier cases in which she had found that
51. Id. at 1315-16, 1317-18, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709-10, 1711-12.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1315, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709.
Id. at 1314-15, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708-09.
Id. at 1314, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
Id.
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union misstatements of employer profits and of wages earned by unionized workers did not, under the circumstances of those cases, require new
elections." In each of those cases, however, the Board had found some
factor that made the misstatements insubstantial even under Hollywood
Ceramics.s5 Chairman Murphy failed to offer any example of a misrepresentation that was egregious, aside from those misrepresentations proscribed by the rule of Members Penello and Walther.
In the cases following Shopping Kart, Chairman Murphy continued to
express her egregious misrepresentation standard of review but in no case
found it applicable.58 After Shopping Kart, but before General Knit, the
Board remedied only misrepresentations involving forgery or improper
use of the Board's name or misdescription of its processes. Thus, in situations in which unions misrepresented that the Board favored them over
the employer,5 9 or in which either employers or unions misrepresented
that the Board had adjudged the opposition guilty of unfair practices,
when in fact the Board had only begun proceedings on a charge or had
accepted a settlement on a charge," the Board acted to set aside elections
won by the offending party. But when mere misrepresentations of any
other matter were alleged, the Board invoked Shopping Kart and dismissed the objections summarily.61 Apparently, the only contribution of
Chairman Murphy's egregious misrepresentation exception to the Shopping Kart rule was to provide the Board with a potential but unused device for future selective expansion of Shopping Kart.
Instead of building in an orderly and limited fashion on Shopping
Kart, however, the Board soon entirely broke with Shopping Kart to rewrite the law of campaign misrepresentation for the second time in less
56. Chairman Murphy cited Contract Knitter, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 579, 90 L.R.R.M. 1484
(1975) and Henderson Trumbell Supply Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 210, 90 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1975).
57. In Henderson, a panel of Members Murphy, Jenkins and Penello affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that a union's claim that the employer "made" over one
million dollars would not be interpreted by employees as meaning that the employer had
earned over one million dollars in profits.
In Contract Knitter, the same panel found that the union's description of wages earned at
other plants was not, under the circumstances, misleading.
58. See, e.g., Cormier Hosiery Mills, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1052 n.3, 95 L.R.R.M. 1461, 1462
n.3 (1977); Thomas E. Gates & Sons, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 705 n.6, 95 L.R.R.M. 1198, 1199 n.6
(1977).
59. See, e.g., Donner Packing Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1697, 98 L.R.R.M. 1594 (1978); GAF
Corp., 234 N.L.R.B. 1209, 97 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1978).
60. See. e.g., Ona Corp., 235 N.L.R.B. 595, 98 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1978); Formco, Inc., 233
N.L.R.B. 61, 96 L.R.R.M. 1392 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Precision Fabricators, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1404, 97 L.R.R.M. 1121 (1977),
Cormier Hosiery Mills, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. at 1052, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1461; Shalom Nursing
Home, 230 N.L.R.B. 980, 95 L.R.R.M. 1436 (1977); Thomas E. Gates & Sons, Inc., 229
N.L.R.B. at 705, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1198.

1981]

SHOPPING KART-GENERAL KNIT DANCE

753

than two years. When Member Walther left the Board and was replaced
by new Member Truesdale, Shopping Kart's tenuous majority coalition
was lost, and the Board was poised for another reversal.
In General Knit a new majority of Chairman Fanning, and Members
Jenkins and Truesdale considered the effect of a union's misrepresentation of the employer's profits in a leaflet distributed to employees on the
eve and morning of the election. Under Shopping Kart, the misrepresentation was clearly not grounds for setting aside the election, and the Acting Regional Director applied Shopping Kart to overrule the employer's
objection." The majority of the Board, however, chose to remand the case
to the Regional Director for further investigation under a resuscitated
Hollywood Ceramics standard."
The majority attacked Shopping Kart as being founded on a number of
faulty premises. First, the majority asserted, the Board's reversal of
Hollywood Ceramics in Shopping Kart rested on the assumption that
Hollywood Ceramics incorrectly viewed employees as "naive and unworldly."" To the contrary, the majority argued, Hollywood Ceramics
aimed primarily at misrepresentations that would mislead "no matter
what the ultimate sophistication of a particular electorate." 6 The availability of redress in such cases, the majority concluded, strengthened the
legitimacy of the election process and acted as a deterrent to improper
campaigning."
Turning to the Getman and Goldberg study, the results of which had
been an important motivating factor for the Board's decision in Shopping
Kart, the majority insisted that the authors' findings actually supported
continued reliance on the Hollywood Ceramics standard.6" The majority
noted that the authors admitted a high correlation between the decision
of previously undecided or pro-employer voters to vote union, and their
familiarity with the union's campaign." The majority noted further the
authors' finding that previously undecided voters and voters who voted
against their initial opinions determined the election outcome in nine of
the thirty-one elections studied."9 Although Professors Getman and
Goldberg had concluded that the overall findings of the study showed
70
that Board regulation of campaign misrepresentations was unnecessary
239 N.L.R.B. 619, 619-20, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687, 1688 (1978).
Id. at 623-24, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1690-91.
Id. at 620, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689.
Id.
Id. at 621, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689.
67. Id. at 621-22, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689-90.
68. Id. at 622, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1190.
69. Id.
70. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & V. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION
REALITY 148-49 (1976).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

ELECTIONS LAW AND
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the General Knit majority argued that the number of undecided and
switching voters (nineteen percent of voting employees) and the number
71
of elections decided by such voters led to the opposite conclusion.
The majority conceded that Hollywood Ceramics had often been criticized as producing inconsistent Board rulings, but insisted that any seeming inconsistencies were the result of "judgmental differences" about the
effect of a misrepresentation, rather than from bias or subtle changes in
the application of the standard. 7' The majority's confidence in Hollywood
Ceramics, however, was obviously shaken by the Shopping Kart experience. Despite their vigorous defense of the Hollywood Ceramics standard,
the majority made a commitment to a more restrained application of the
law:
In any event, our primary focus is on the future application of this standard and not on the past. It is our goal to adhere strictly to the standard
articulated in Hollywood Ceramics and to apply that standard equally to
both sides, while still allowing the parties the opportunity to campaign
vigorously for their particular positions."
Moreover, the majority may have implied a revision of the Hollywood
Ceramics test of substantiality, for in recalling the dissenting opinion in
Shopping Kart, they quoted language from that opinion indicating that a
misrepresentation would not warrant the setting aside of an election unless the facts misrepresented were within the special knowledge of the
campaigner.7 4 It could be argued, therefore, that the majority opinion in
Hollywood Ceramics elevated the special knowledge factor to the rank of
an absolute requirement.
Members Penello and Murphy wrote dissenting opinions based on the
positions they had taken in Shopping Kart. Member Penello reiterated
his arguments that Hollywood Ceramics led to inconsistency in Board
rulings and delay in the certification of collective bargaining representatives. The majority's interpretation of the Getman-Goldberg study, he
charged, was a "fourfold misrepresentation" of that study's results:
The majority errs in asserting that the study found that the voters of 19
percent (13 percent who voted contrary to their precampaign intent
(switchers) and 6 percent who were undecided) were based on information provided by the campaign. The study made no such finding. What
the study found was that only the 5 percent of the total sample who
either switched to the union or were originally undecided and ultimately
voted for the union could be said to have been influenced by the content
71.
72.
73.
74.

239 N.L.R.B. at 622, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1690.
Id.
Id. at 622-23, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1690-91.
Id. at 620, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689.
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of the campaign of the party for which they voted ....
Thus, in contrast, "there was. . . no evidence that familiarity with the content of the
company campaign was associated with switching to 7the
company" or
5
voting for the company after initially being undecided.
In response to the majority's promise to embark on a more careful application of Hollywood Ceramics, Member Penello noted the majority's
inconsistent opinion in another case, Synalloy Corp.,7 6 decided the same
day as General Knit. In Synalloy Corp., the union distributed to employees of Blackmun-Uhler Chemical Division a leaflet that reproduced on
one side a report to stockholders of the Blackmun-Uhler's parent, Synalloy Corporation. The report showed that Synalloy's profits had grown by
250 percent over the same period of the previous year. The other side of
the leaflet asked:
WHERE'S YOUR SHARE OF THE BLACKMUN-UHLER PROFIT
BONANZA?
What was your wage increase in the same year that Blackmun-Uhler hit
the profit jackpot? Compare the raise you received ... to the over 250%
increase in Company profits.7"
Not reported by the leaflet was that, although the profits of Synalloy had
increased, the employer division, Blackmun-Uhler, had experienced a
fifty percent decline in profits.78
When Synalloy Corp. first reached the Board, two years before Shopping Kart and three years before GeneralKnit, the Board found that the
union's misrepresentation of the employer's profits did not warrant a new
election since employees could be expected to understand that the profits
attributed to Blackmun-Uhler were in fact earned by Synalloy.7 ° The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the union leaflet
conveyed the message that the 250 percent increase in profits was wholly
attributable to the Blackmun-Uhler Division of Synalloy, rather than to
the sum of all of Synalloy's operations."0 However, the court remanded
the case to the Board to allow the Board to decide whether the case
should be governed by a retroactive application of Shopping Kart. In an
opinion issued concurrently with General Knit, the Board held that the
75. Id. at 628 n.36, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1695 n.36.
76. 239 N.L.R.B. 637, 99 L.R.R.M. 1702 (1978).
77. See Member Penello's recitation of the Synalloy facts in General Knit, Inc., 239
N.L.R.B. at 625, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1692.
78. Id.
79. Synalloy Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 827, 92 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1976).
80. Synalloy Corp. v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc). The en banc court
reversed a panel decision, Synalloy Corp. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1977), which had
granted enforcement of the Board's order.
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Shopping Kart rule would not be applied to Synalloy Corp.8' Rather, the
Board reluctantly remanded the case to the Regional Director for the
purpose of conducting a second election. Chairman Fanning and Member
Jenkins stated that, but for the decision of the Fourth Circuit, they would
reaffirm their earlier holding that the misrepresentation did not warrant
the setting aside of the first election under Hollywood Ceramics."
In contrast, Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, together with
Member Truesdale, agreed that the union's misrepresentation of employer profits in General Knit might warrant the setting aside of the election. The leaflet distributed by the union in General Knit read as follows:
WHO IS FOOLING WHO???
GENERAL KNIT CAN CRY POOR MOUTH IF THEY WANT, BUT
LET'S LOOK AT THE FACTS.
IN 1976, GENERAL KNIT HAD SALES OF $25 MILLION.
GENERAL KNIT IS OWNED BY ITOH WHO HAS A NET WORTH
IN EXCESS OF $2 MILLION.
THIS COMPANY HAD AN INCREASE OF 12.5% IN SALES FOR
PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 1977.
DURING THIS PERIOD THIS COMPANY HAD A PROFIT OF $19.3
MILLION.
DON'T BE FOOLED BY GENERAL KNIT AND THEIR HIGH
PRICE LAWYERS.
ITOH WHO OWNS GENERAL KNIT IS MAKING IT BIG AND CAN
AFFORD DECENT WAGES FOR ITS EMPLOYEES.
VOTE YES, TODAY, AND MAKE THE COMPANY SHARE3 SOME
OF THEIR HIGH PROFITS WITH YOU - THE WORKER.
Actually, the employer alleged, General Knit had sustained a 5 million
dollar loss during 1976, while the parent company, ITOH, had earned a
19.3 million dollar profit."
In his General Knit dissent, Member Penello observed that the union's
misrepresentation was not distinguishable in any significant respect from
the union's misrepresentation in Synalloy Corp.8 5 Nevertheless, the majority had chosen to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing with the
81. 239 N.L.R.B. at 637, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1702.
82. Id.
83. 239 N.L.R.B. at 619, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1688.
84. Id. at 630, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1687.
85. Id. at 629-30, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1696.
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necessary implication that the employer would prevail if the facts alleged
were proved to be true." Thus, Member Penello concluded, the majority's
ruling was directly contrary to its insistence in Synalloy Corp. that such a
misrepresentation should not warrant the setting aside of an election.8 7 In
addition, Member Penello noted that the majority's holding effectively
overruled a long line of Board decisions - frequently reversed by the
courts - holding that a union's misrepresentation of company profits did
not warrant the setting aside of an election." In contradiction with the
goal of relaxed review of campaign propaganda announced in Modine,
Member Penello argued, the majority had apparently initiated a more demanding standard of review.8"
Finally, Member Penello expressed skepticism of the majority's stated
intent to reduce delay and inconsistency by applying Hollywood Ceramics
"strictly." The problems of delay and inconsistency, Member Penello insisted, were inherent in the Hollywood Ceramics standard;9° 'and he regretted the Board's failure to allow the Shopping Kart experiment a "fair
chance" to succeed where Hollywood Ceramics had failed. 1
Member Murphy, also in dissent, reiterated her Shopping Kart proposal that elections should be set aside only for misrepresentations of the
Board and its processes, forgery, or other egregious misrepresentations."
Like Member Penello, she found the Hollywood Ceramics standard to be
inherently flawed,' and she accused the majority of applying Hollywood
Ceramics in a manner "condescending" to employees." "If presidential
elections were supervised by the Board's new majority here," Member
Murphy lamented, "democracy in the United States would be long dead
86. Id. at 630, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1697.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 631, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1698. Among the Board decisions cited by Member
Penello for the proposition that misrepresentation of profits does not warrant the setting
aside of an election were Electronic Components Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 829, 88 L.R.R.M. 1126
(1974); and Cumberland Wood & Chair Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. 312, 86 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1974).
Cases cited by Member Penello in which the Board was reversed by the courts were
Blackman-Uhler Chem. Div. Synafloy Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 561 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1977); Alson Mfg. Aerospace Div. of Alson Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 523 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1975); Aircraft Radio Corp. (Div. of Cessna Aircraft Co.) v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1975); Argus
Optics v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975); Lake Odessa Mach. Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 512
F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1975);-LaCrescent Constant Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 1319
(8th Cir. 1975); Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 631-32, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1698.
91. Id. at 632, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1698.
92. Id. at 632-33,- 99 L.R.R.M. at 1699.
93. Id. at 635, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1701.
94. Id. at 636, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1702.
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or at least long denied." s
Since General Knit, the Hollywood Ceramics faction of Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins, and Truesdale has maintained its majority
position on Board review of campaign misrepresentations, while Members
Penello and Murphy continue to voice their adherence to their Shopping
Kart opinions.9 Still unresolved is whether the Hollywood Ceramics
standard is any different after General Knit than before General Knit.
The majority suggested in General Knit, as it had in Modine, that the
factor of the "special knowledge" of the campaigner would be regarded in
the future as a requirement before any misrepresentation would be found
to warrant the setting aside of an election. In at least one case after General Knit, the majority has repeated its intention to apply this new version of the Hollywood Ceramics test s9 and Member Truesdale has stated
unofficially that the special knowledge factor is a requirement."
Yet the majority's action in General Knit confounds this interpretation
of the majority's opinion. In General Knit, the Board apparently overruled previous cases holding that a union's misrepresentation of the employer's profits did not warrant the setting aside of an election. 0 In at
least one of those cases, Cumberland Wood & Chair Corp.,100 the Board
seemed to have concluded that a union's misrepresentation of an employer's profits is not material because a union cannot have special
knowledge of an employer's profits. In overruling the earlier misrepresentation of profits cases, or at least overlooking them, the majority made no
mention of the special knowledge issue.
Clearly, a union may be said to have special knowledge of the wages
and benefits it has negotiated for other workers,101 but it is difficult to see
how a union might acquire real or apparent special knowledge of the employer's profits without claiming to have made an independent investigation of such profits. If by "special knowledge" the General Knit majority
meant that the campaigner need only claim or appear to have at hand
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Cormier Hosiery Mill, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 5, 101 L.R.R.M. 1363 (June
25, 1979); Nash Finch Co., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 198, 101 L.R.R.M. 1492 (June 18, 1979); Fontaine Truck Equip. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 101 L.R.R.M. 1047 (Apr. 23, 1979); Huntsville Mfg. Co., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 100 L.R.R.M. 1435 (Mar. 6,1979).
97. See Huntsville Mfg. Co., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 100 L.R.R.M. 1435 (Mar. 6, 1979).
98. See Truesdale, From General Shoe to General Knit: A Return to Hollywood Ceramics, 30 LAB. L.J. 67, 70 (1979).

99. See Electronic Components Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 829, 88 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1974); and
Cumberland Wood & Chair Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. at 312, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1426.
100. 211 N.L.R.B. 312, 313, 86 L.R.R.M. 1426, 1427, (1974). See also the dissenting opinion in Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 1315, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709.
101. See, e.g., Hook Drugs, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1502, 41 L.R.R.M. 1351 (1958); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 744, 748, 39 L.R.R.M. 1317, 1318 (1957).
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information superior to that of the listening employees, so that any
description of the opposition's affairs based on research of public records
would give the campaigner knowledge then superior to that of his audience, the majority's addition of the special knowledge factor appears to
have contributed nothing to the Hollywood Ceramics standard.
Hollywood Ceramics has never been applied in cases in which a campaigner misrepresented facts already known to employees. Indeed, the
campaigner's special knowledge has not been an issue in the decision of a
single misrepresentation case since General Knit.
The majority's opinion in General Knit also suggested a new attitude
by its recollection of the promise made in Modine not to insist on "improbable purity," and by its contention that Hollywood Ceramics aimed
primarily at misrepresentations that would mislead "no matter what the
ultimate sophistication of a particular electorate."' 2 One might take this
to mean that the Board would presume at least an "average" degree of
sophistication among employees. But the Board's message on this point
was again muddled by its finding of a possible violation in the union's
confused explanation of company profits, a form of misrepresentation
that employees previously were thought equipped to recognize.
III.

A

CRITIcAL EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF

Hollywood Ceramics

and Shopping Kart
The criticism most frequently asserted about Hollywood Ceramics, and
the foundation for most other criticisms of this case is that the laboratory
conditions test cannot be consistently and rationally applied to misrepresentation cases due to the subjective character of the test and the customary puffery and exaggeration of election campaigns. It was the difficulty of applying Hollywood Ceramics consistently that Members Penello
and Murphy and former-Member Walther cited as the primary reason for
adopting a new standard of review.
In large part the problem of inconsistency is due to the exceedingly
malleable nature of campaign rhetoric when subjected to close scrutiny.
Campaign statements are typically ambiguous, whether by intention or
out of carelessness. In reviewing ambiguous language, the Board must select from many possible meanings the meaning most likely conveyed to
employees. This, in turn, requires the Board to determine whether employees should be expected to recognize or suspect the error of any misleading meaning.
Not surprisingly, the results of misrepresentation cases are often discordant. Nor has the General Knit majority's promise to apply
102.

239 N.L.R.B. at 623, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1691.
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Hollywood Ceramics strictly made the Board's application of Hollywood
Ceramics any more predictable. As Member Penello noted in his General
Knit dissent, the majority's promise provides no new rule or method by
which the problems of the past may be avoided. 10 3 For example, in the
post-General Knit case of Robbins & Myers, Inc.,'" the Board set aside
an election in which the employer stated to his employees, "once a union
gets in, there is basically no turning back-you are stuck with it from
then on."10 Strictly speaking, the statement was a misrepresentation
since workers can vote to decertify a union. Based on this reasoning, the
Board found the statement to be a substantial misrepresentation.'0 6 Yet
the language can just as easily and more reasonably be interpreted to reflect the employer's opinion or prediction that once a union wins an election, it is very difficult to decertify it because of its institutional strength.
The Board apparently assumed that employees would not attribute the
latter meaning to the employer's statement. Employees, one might conclude from this, should be expected to take campaign speech literally and
to endow generalities with legal significance.
I other cases, the Board has shown a much greater willingness to grant
words their least insidious meaning and to assume that employees would
do likewise. In Miller's Pre-paredPotato Co.,"'7 another case decided after General Knit, the union told employees that "[tihe Union will negotiate for better pay and benefits. The members of this Union get salaries
between $3.90 to $200.00 an hour."10 8 The Board might have interpreted
these words to mean that the employees to whom the message was directed might earn anywhere from three dollars and ninety cents to two
hundred dollars an hour with the union. Given this meaning, the statement was false, since no union members of the same occupation as the
audience earned two hundred dollars per h6ur. The Board, however,
granted the words their more reasonable meaning. The first sentence,
considered separately, was merely a boast. The second sentence, considered separately, was true since there were union members who as entertainers earned two hundred dollars an hour. 1'" While this result is probably correct if the employees are presumed to be reasonably skeptical, it is
difficult to reconcile with the result in Robbins & Myers, in which the
Board focused on the most misleading of two possible interpretations and
presumed the employees to have very little sophistication.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 632, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1698.
241 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 100 L.R.R.M. 1523 (Mar. 16, 1979).
100 L.R.R.M. at 1524.
Id. at 1524-25.
240 N.L.R.B. 1302, 100 L.R.R.M. 1460 (1979).
Id. at 1302, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1461.
Id. at 1303, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1461.
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Even when the meaning of a statement is clear, the Board must still
make a subjective judgment about the significance of the error it contains. Again, the ultimate question is how the campaigner's statement was
probably received by the employees. Statements that are only slightly in
error, or that are of no importance to employees, do not warrant the setting aside of an election. 1
In some instances, however, the Board appears to have tolerated a very
high margin of error. In the pre-GeneralKnit case of Diamond Electronics Division,"" a union misrepresented to voting employees that it had
won a seventy cent per hour wage increase in negotiations at a nearby
unionized factory. Actually, the union had won a wage increase of only
fifty cents per hour. The Board held the misrepresentation to be insubstantial in a decision that was later reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of
1 12
Appeals.

In other cases, the Board seems to have exercised an overabundance of
caution. In Ereno Lewis,11 3 for example, the Board overturned an election
on the basis of a misrepresentation that by the standards of Diamond
Electronics seemed relatively minor. The employer in Ereno Lewis told
employees that it "understood" that the union's initiation fee would be
one hundred and four dollars and implied that the full amount was to be
paid immediately upon membership. " ' In fact the initiation fee was sixty
dollars, but in addition to the initiation fee the union also charged twenty
dollars for a death benefit contribution, and twenty-seven dollars for
three months dues in advance.11 5 The total amount due upon initiation,
therefore, was one hundred and seven dollars or three dollars more than
the employer's estimate. However, employees were allowed to pay the one
hundred and seven dollars due on initiation over a sixty day period. 1
Member Kennedy thought the misrepresentation of the initiation, fee
substantial in itself, because the employer had described the entire
amount as an initiation fee rather than breaking the amount down into
its component parts.117 Member Kennedy also thought it important that
the employer had failed to explain that twenty-seven dollars of the
amount due upon initiation was credited towards three months dues.11 8
Member Jenkins thought that the employer's description of the amount
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
225 N.L.R.B. 203, 92 L.R.R.M. 1431 (1976).
Diamond Elecs. Div. of Arvin Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1978).
217 N.L.R.B. 239, 88 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1975).
217 N.L.R.B. at 239, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1481.
Id.

116.

Id.

117.
118.

Id. at 240, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1481.
Id.
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due upon initiation was not a substantial misrepresentation, but agreed
that the election was tainted because the employer had implied that the
entire amount was due at once, rather than over sixty days. 11' Member
Penello dissented on the ground that he no longer adhered to Hollywood
Ceramics.2 0
The General Knit majority did not purport to establish any new standard of significance or any new inquiry designed to determine what might
be significant to employees. A post-General Knit case dealing with the
significance of an outsider's approval of a union further illustrates the
Board's failure or inability to address this aspect of Hollywood Ceramics
carefully. In GuardianMedical Services, Inc.,"21 a union distributed a bogus letter signed by Coretta Scott King on stationary of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center of Social Justice, endorsing the union's organizational efforts.' The employer objected to the letter as constituting fraud
and calling upon racial pride or prejudice. Nevertheless, the Board held,
with little discussion, that the union's misrepresentation did not warrant
the setting aside of the election.
On the other hand, it is an established rule, affirmed even by Shopping
Kart, that a misrepresentation that the NLRB favors the campaigner's
position is per se a significant misrepresentation. 23 The Board's assumption, of course, is that the government's opinion is of great importance to
workers. While in GuardianMedical Services the Board thought it was
necessary to note that the case did not involve misrepresentation of a
government endorsement, it failed to explain its rejection of the employer's contention that, to blacks, the Martin Luther King Center's position and Coretta Scott King's position are at least as important as the
government's position.
Understandably, the courts have not perceived any new intelligible
Board method for applying General Knit. Thus, the high rate of reversals
of Board decisions on appeal has continued after General Knit.'2 4 The
reversing courts charge that the Board has failed to adhere to its own
Hollywood Ceramics rule and occasionally remind the Board of its "laboratory conditions" standard. 28 The disagreement between the courts and
the Board typically turns on the extent to which voting employees must
be relied upon to view propaganda with skepticism and identify ambigui-

119. Id. at 240, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1481-82.
120. Id. at 240, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1482.
121. 239 N.L.R.B. 1264, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1143 (1979).
122. Id. at 1265, 100 L.R.R.M. at 1144.
123. See Rebmar, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1434, 70 L.R.R.M. 1018 (1968).
124. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pinkerton's Inc., 621 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Van
Gorp Corp., 615 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1980).
125. See, e.g., 621 F.2d 1322.
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ties and non sequiturs. se On this question, the courts have heeded
neither the Board's insistence that it has started from a clean slate, nor
the Board's purported new standard of law giving greater credit to the
sophistication of voting employees. In view of the continuing inconsistency of the Board, the uncertainty of the Board's present position, and
the failure of the Board to articulate new rules or standards, the courts
cannot be faulted for holding
the Board to the more demanding labora1
tory conditions standard. '
The Shopping Kart answer to the intractable problems of inconsistent
and unpredictable regulation was to eliminate Board review of campaign
misrepresentations in all but a small and clearly defined category of
cases.12 8 This is not to say that either Chairman Murphy's or Member
Penello's solution would have been free from all difficulty. To mandate
that the Board will remedy only "egregious" misrepresentations is not unquestionably clearer than a standard based on what is "substantial."
Member Penello's rule, that only a misrepresentation of the Board or its
process or a forgery of a document should be remedied, certainly limits
the types of cases requiring Board intervention. Nevertheless, within that
defined class of cases inconsistency remains a problem. In Gulton Industries,'1" for example, a majority of Member Jenkins and Chairman Murphy held that a union's statement to employees that the employer had
broken the law was a misrepresentation since the Board had made no
finding of guilt.8 0 As Member Truesdale aptly noted in dissent, however,
an accusation of lawbreaking is not necessarily the same as a charge that
a final judgment of guilt has been entered. 8 Two years later in AllisChalmers Corp.,8 2 a majority of Chairman Fanning and Member Penello
ignored Gulton Industries and held the following union statement not to
be a charge that the employer had been found guilty of wrongful
discharge.
COMPANY FOUND GUILTY OF WRONGFUL FIRING. Why does
the Company feel they can kick folks around in Mississippi? Maybe the
126. See, e.g., 621 F.2d 1322; 615 F.2d 759.
127. Some indication of the judiciary's growing impatience with the Board may be found
in NLRB v. Mosey Mfg. Co., 595 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1979), remanding a case decided under
Shopping Kart for reconsideration under General Knit, after commenting: "That the Board
may have on-again, off-again standards, whatever the effect thereof upon the concept of
[administrative] 'expertise,' would not warrant the court in itself applying standards not
actually applied by the Board." 595 F.2d at 378.
128. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
129. 240 N.L.R.B. 546, 100 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1979).
130. Id., 100 L.R.R.M. at 1321-22.
131. Id., 100 L.R.R.M. at 1322.
132. 252 N.L.R.B. No. 112. 105 L.R.R.M. 1336 (1980).
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Company thinks they are above the lawll The NLBR [sic] has recommended that Randy Cook be put back to work with full back pay. But
the Company is still fighting for their right to fire anyone when ever
08
[sic] they want to.'
The majority reasoned that the message following the title made clear
that the proceedings against the employer were not final." In this instance, however, the Board seems to have presumed that the employees
were not only sophisticated but so educated in the law that they would
recognize that the Board's "recommendation" must not have been based
on a final judgment.
As these cases illustrate, virtually any regulation of campaign propaganda is bound to result in judgments of questionable consistency. The
advantage of Member Penello's solution is that the problem is more circumscribed, presumably in the area where campaign misrepresentations
are most dangerous. Indeed, following Shopping Kart and prior to General Knit, the number of objections filed by unions and employers based
on alleged misrepresentations was cut nearly in half." 5
The General Knit majority's answer to the charge that Hollywood Ceramics was inherently defective was to maintain that the integrity of the
election process required some Board regulation of the content of campaign speech, however difficult the task might be. "' Such a defense of
Hollywood Ceramics overlooks the incongruity of using censorship to protect electoral integrity, for by censorship the Board makes the election
process inherently suspect. Thus, some critics have suggested that the
Board tilts in favor of unions in misrepresentation cases.1 3 7 Raw statistics
lend some support to this assertion, since over the years the success rate
of unions before the Board in misrepresentation cases has been substantially higher than the success rate for employers.'" On the other hand,
the remarkably high rate of reversals for Board decisions on appeal in the
courts may stem from the courts' comparatively greater sympathy for
employers.
While the statistics are subject to other interpretation,'
the suspicion
133. 105 L.R.R.M. at 1337.
134. Id. at 1338.
135. General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. at 629, 99 L.R.R.M. 1696 (Member Penello,
dissenting).
136. 239 N.L.R.B. 621, 99 L.R.R.M. at 169.
137. See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 400 F.2d at 146; N.L.R.B. v. Lord Baltimore
Press, Inc., 370 F.2d at 401.
138. See Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 1316, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710
(Member Fanning, dissenting).
139. Because of the delays inherent in the certification and appeals process, an employer
may feel that, by pursuing claims of improbable merit, it can at least delay certification of a
collective bargaining representative. In the time it would take for a union to carry its objec-
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that results from the statistics and the Board's apparent inconsistency is
in itself a serious challenge to the integrity of the election lirocess. Because the Hollywood Ceramics standard is so subjective, a defense of the
standard against a charge of bias or arbitrariness is made quite difficult.
Moreover, Hollywood Ceramics sets a standard for election campaign
conduct that is almost unique in the administration of elections. While
statutes in some states prohibit the making of false statements by political candidates and prescribe criminal and civil sanctions, 1 0 these statutes
are very rarely enforced141 and are of questionable constitutionality.'42 After all, the decision to leave important decisions to the vote of the general
population or to the employees of a workshop must have as its premise
that the electorate is generally capable of dealing with campaign propaganda. Censorship is not often practiced in political campaigns because of
the generally accepted proposition that censorship presents a much
greater danger to the political process than campaign misrepresentation. 4" If a candidate's misrepresentation is truly reckless or malicious,
the opposing candidate is not left without any remedy. At least in situations in which misrepresentation mischaracterizes the other party, libel
laws apply against candidates for office or representation as they do
against the news media. " Indeed, it may be recalled that the Board's
early answer to empldyers injured by a union's misrepresentation was
that libel law provided the exclusive and sufficient remedy.'4 5 On the
other hand, the availability of libel law remedies has not produced the
kind of paternalistic interference with election campaigns that NLRB
regulation has caused in union representation elections.
The General Knit majority identified no factor that made the employee
electorate more needful of protection than the general political electorate.
To the contrary, the majority relied heavily on the philosophy of Modine,
in which the Board had conceded that employee voters had greatly matured after decades of experience under the labor laws. 4 6s In their Shoptions against the employer through every level of appeal, however, the time bar against an-

other representation election will have been lifted and the union may petition for a new
election. See J. Feerick, supra note 35 at 260-61. Consequently, a union is likely to appeal
from the certification of representation election results only if the likelihood of success is
relatively high.
140. See generally Developments In The Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 12721286 (1975).
141. Id. at 1280-81.
142. Id. at 1281-86.
143. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971); United States v. CIO,
335 U.S. 106, 144 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring.)
144. See Developments in the Law: Elections, supra note 140, at 1275-86.
145. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
146. 203 N.L.R.B. at 530, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1136.
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ping Kart dissent, however, Members Fanning and Jenkins asserted that
regulation under Hollywood Ceramics was partly responsible for the relatively high level of employee participation in representation elections,
and "that voters in political elections may refrain from voting to the extent they do partly because they are reluctant or unable to rely on the
representations made
when there is no satisfactory method of review of
' 47
campaign conduct.

1

If employees were in fact responsive to representation campaign speech
and literature, the claim that regulation encourages participation and
preserves the integrity of the election might have great merit despite the
flaws of the Hollywood Ceramics standard. The best available empirical
evidence of the effectiveness and influence of union or employer campaigns is supplied by the Getman-Goldberg study of representation elections. "14 8 However, as illustrated by the lively debate in Shopping Kart
and General Knit, the Getman-Goldberg study of representation campaigns and employee voting patterns might be adduced either for or
against the proposition that campaign propaganda plays an important
role in the outcome of representation elections. On the one hand, the
study concludes that only a small minority of the voters studied were receptive to the campaigns of unions and employers.1 49 On the other hand,
the study indicates that the small minority who vote according to what is
learned during the campaign often constituted the margin of victory. 50
Unfortunately, the Getman-Goldberg study did not analyze the ability
of the employees to digest campaign propaganda intelligently. Equally as
important as the question of whether employees listen to propaganda is
the question of whether employees are fooled by what they hear. If the
number of employees who listen is small, one may assume that the number of employees fooled is smaller still.
Another shortcoming of the Getman-Goldberg study is that the study
was conducted only under the rules of Hollywood Ceramics, providing no
measure of the deterrent effect of Board regulation. Thus, the General
Knit majority argued forcibly that the most important effect of
Hollywood Ceramics is the nonoccurence of undesirable conduct and
poisoned elections that would occur but for Board regulation. 5 1 The de-

terrence argument is perhaps the most compelling argument raised by the
General Knit majority, and it is an argument never directly addressed by
Member Penello or Member Murphy.
Instead, Members Penello and Murphy adopted the position that in
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

228 N.L.R.B. at 1317, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1711.
See Getman, supra note 70, at 148-49.
Id. at 73-109.
Id. at 103.
239 N.L.R.B. at 621, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689.
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the absence of any visible benefits, and in light of the tangible costs,
Board regulation should be eliminated, save for a few narrow exceptions.
The majority in General Knit might have answered, however, that the
Shopping Kart solution appears to be no solution at all, but only a surrender to an unmanageable problem.
But, Shopping Kart was really less a capitulation than an attempted
readjustment of the balance between the Board's desire for purity in representation elections and its respect for the responsibility of the voting
employees. Shopping Kart represented an admission that employees are
generally experienced voters who can and must be relied upon to gauge
the credibility of any statement by its timing and source. Twelfth hour
"revelations" by partisan campaigners that leave no chance for rebuttal
are not very persuasive. In the small number of instances in which such
conduct will affect the outcome of an election, the tainted result is for a
limited term and might better be left to correction by future elections,
when the untruthful party may be forced to live with its earlier misrepresentations-than left to correction by the often sluggish Board review
procedure.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Though Shopping Kart also might have unleashed more vigorous
campaigning by unions and employers, a less restrained campaign style is
not necessarily to be disdained. The Supreme Court's erection of substantial barriers to libel suits against the news media was undertaken "against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 15 ' The same policy has been applied to libel suits by employers against unions.1 5'
Regrettably, the electorate is sometimes misguided by campaigners who
rely on unfair campaign tactics. In politics at least, this is the accepted
cost of pursuing other important goals, such as finality and unrestrained
communication. When employers or unions misrepresent the facts to employees, the fault is of the campaigners and not of the Board. Only when
the Board attempts too much to act as referee must it defend itself
against charges of unfairness.
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).

